


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SPECIAL REPORT

ZAMBIA AND ITS REFUGEE NATIONALIST PROBLEM

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ZAMBIA AND ITS REFUGEE NATIONALIST PROBLEM

As the confrontation sharpens between Black African nationalists and white settlers determined to perpetuate their control of southern Africa, recently independent countries on the periphery of this area find themselves under extremely strong pressures. The nationalists tend to view these countries as existing exclusively for their usefulness as bases for another assault on colonialism.

Leaders like Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, however, are trying to build a state, not merely a launching platform for black nationalist operations, and they are as acutely aware of the geographic and economic realities that tie them to the white-controlled areas as they are of the emotional attractions of the "liberation movements." Their dilemma is compounded by an influx of political refugees, organized into a number of often competing groups and supported by various international organizations. Their problem is how to keep refugees and their supporters reasonably satisfied while avoiding the economic--and possibly even military--retaliations that the Portuguese, the South Africans, and, at this time especially, the Rhodesians might bring to bear. The problem affects Tanzania, Malawi, Congo (Leopoldville), and other states in varying degrees, but at the moment seems most acute in Zambia.

The Setting


Geology and geography tie Zambia economically to the white ruled territories of southern Africa. Mining and refining copper--the basis for Zambia's material development--require coal and power from Rhodesia as well as uninterrupted use of rail lines running through Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique to the coast.

Zambia's economic collaboration with these neighbors has continued smoothly since the country became independent last October, but the threat of an

abrupt termination, especially as a result of political trends in Rhodesia, has grown steadily.

Last fall it appeared that Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith, driving for full independence from Britain on terms that would entrench white supremacy, might make a unilateral declaration of independence--"UDI." Under such an imminent threat, Rhodesian African nationalists have beat the drums for international intervention, through the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and/or the United Nations. It now appears,

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however, that Smith, having won an overwhelming victory in the parliamentary election last May, may resist white extremist pressures and make some concessions to London, which has said it would withhold independence until eventual majority rule is somehow assured. On the British side, anxiety to forestall a UDI and to avoid mutually damaging punitive measures might lead London to grant independence on terms that technically preserve a hope of eventual majority rule but do not satisfy the African nationalists.

If the African nationalists should then call for international intervention in Rhodesia, Kaunda's government would face the problem of a direct clash between militant African nationalism and Zambia's fundamental economic interests. Zambia's location makes it the prime site for any African military or paramilitary operations against Rhodesia, and international attention would focus on Kaunda's response to a mobilization of African "freedom fighters." The results of the contingency planning initiated in response to the threat of a Rhodesian UDI apparently have convinced Kaunda that Zambia cannot afford to provoke an all-out economic boycott by Rhodesia, and he says he will not grant sanctuary to members of Rhodesian African nationalist organizations which resort to violence. It is problematical whether Kaunda could hold this line against the pressures which the Rhodesian refugee leaders might develop in a crisis, and also whether he could stop them from engaging in terrorist activ-

ity which would have the effect of sabotaging his moderate policy.

Refugee Organizations And Their Backers

The most direct pressures on Kaunda come from the refugees themselves. At least 15 nationalist organizations, competing for leadership of liberation movements in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, and South West Africa, maintain branch offices in Zambia. Well over a thousand refugees from these countries entered Zambia during 1964, and the influx is increasing. Most refugees eventually proceed to Tanzania and beyond, but several thousand are estimated to be sojourning in Zambia. The emigré leaders ostensibly concern themselves with the welfare of their compatriots in the refugee camps in Zambia, but also make the most of the opportunities for proselytizing.

Although most of these leaders have little real power of their own, they gain formidable leverage over Kaunda by exploiting various factors which derive from the emergence of his capital, Lusaka, as a pan-African center. In Lusaka they can mingle with Zambian politicians and plead their causes with Kaunda's rivals in his United National Independence Party (UNIP). Although Kaunda and his moderate faction of the party have stayed on top, Kaunda's inclination is to placate rather than crush opposition elements, and even his basic policies tend to drift in

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the factional cross currents. Kaunda's foreign policy, which implies limited collaboration with the white regimes, is especially vulnerable to demagogic criticism from UNIP's rank and file, which retain strong anti-colonial traditions. Kaunda's rivals might at some point decide that supporting liberation movements would pay off in their domestic maneuvers.

In a somewhat similar way, foreign nationalists exert pressures on Kaunda through other African heads of state and through the OAU. The leaders of independent African states which are not as vulnerable as Zambia to economic reprisals by the white regimes are relatively unrestrained in proffering support for the liberation movements. Their main vehicle is the OAU's nine-nation coordinating committee for the Liberation of Africa, commonly known as the African Liberation Committee (ALC), with headquarters in Tanzania's capital, Dar es Salaam.

Although the OAU has actually allotted it only limited funds, the committee's mere existence lends an aura of pan-African solidarity to adventures undertaken by the more militant regimes. Thus Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, and Tanzania have provided paramilitary training for freedom fighters from several southern African countries, and the committee apparently has sought to facilitate the movement of trainees to and from various training sites. This kind of international sponsorship makes it doubly difficult for Kaunda to turn back freedom fighters who want to move through Zambia.

Much of the foreign nationalist pressure upon Kaunda emanates from Tanzania. Most of the nationalist organization of southern Africa have branch offices in Dar es Salaam, and the ruling group in Tanzania gives them relatively uninhibited support, including Communist-supplied arms which are smuggled through Zambia. The Tanzanian foreign minister, Oscar Kambona, is chairman of the ALC. Kaunda is especially sensitive to pressure from Tanzanian leaders, since the geographic proximity of the two countries, their common experience with British cultural influences, and membership in the Commonwealth make Zambia's politicians feel that fostering an especially close relationship with Tanzania is the best way to make their influence felt among other independent African nations.

The Communist countries too are contributing to inflate the liberation movements into international causes difficult for Zambia to handle. Most of the southern African nationalist organizations have been receiving some Communist support, mostly paramilitary or political training conducted in the Communist countries. Although the Soviet and Chinese Communist embassies in Dar es Salaam have been the primary instruments for arranging overseas travel, a large portion of the trainees appear to have passed through Zambia. According to an official Rhodesian estimate, at least 100 Rhodesian African nationalists moved through Zambia en route to Communist countries between June and September of last year.

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SECRET

By March of this year, the USSR and Communist China had established embassies in Lusaka; Zambia had agreed to accept an embassy from Czechoslovakia; and East Germany, denied diplomatic recognition, had sent a trade delegation. These missions will obviously give the Communists greater capabilities for contact with the refugee nationalists in Zambia and for general trouble-making.

Kaunda's Controls

Faced with these actual and potential difficulties, Kaunda appears to have tried in the past eight months to maintain and even tighten the procedures for handling refugees which had been worked out by British administrators. The basic policy is to extend humanitarian assistance to individual refugees while keeping the nationalist organizations from using Zambian territory as a base for paramilitary or other flagrantly subversive operations against their home governments. The independent Zambian Government has also retained the established rules that would-be immigrants must offer useful skills or other means of support, and that transients must have some assurance that they will be accepted in Tanzania or elsewhere.

Most of the emigré nationalist branches now operating in Zambia were established before independence, and Kaunda has refused several requests from other nationalist organizations to open offices in Lusaka. Since independence Zambia also has

denied entry to several bands of Rhodesians and Mozambicans, trained and organized elsewhere for paramilitary action, who hoped to cross Zambia in order to reinfiltrate their homelands.

In January, the Zambian Government announced particularly strict regulations concerning foreign political organizations operating in Zambia. Each organization can maintain one office in Zambia, which must be situated in Lusaka and must limit its staff to six persons. Its staff personnel must give advance notice for travel outside Lusaka and cannot engage in active recruitment or fund raising. Since most of the refugees are situated in camps outside Lusaka, and several foreign nationalist organizations had maintained branches at the camps or in mining towns, full enforcement of the new regulations would mean a much tighter rein on the foreign nationalist leaders.

But the force available to keep the refugees in line seems likely to be one of diminishing effectiveness. Since independence the Zambian Government has made an intensive effort to expand the police force (about 6,000 men in August 1964) while maintaining its previously high morale and efficiency. Tightening the border controls has received high priority, with some 50 new stations projected during 1964-65.

However, the increase in the numerical strength of the police force probably has been more than offset by the departure of many experienced European officers.

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In August 1964, 76 percent of the 617 police officers on active duty were Europeans, but well over half of the European officers were expected to resign within a year. Such resignations increased sharply because of the prospect that the service would be Africanized rapidly following independence, but training and promotion of Africans to officer status in fact has lagged far behind the attrition rate for European officers. Last October,

crackdown on violations by the Chinese, who had been actively cultivating refugee leaders.

Kaunda has also tried to maneuver other African governments and the OAU into sharing the onus for excluding freedom fighters from Zambia. He has urged Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda to join him in more effective measures for controlling the flow of refugees across national boundaries. Several requests from Angolan and Mozambican nationalist organizations to establish branch offices in Zambia have been parried by citing decisions of the ALC, which in these cases has settled on other organizations as the "official" liberators.

Perhaps the best remaining hope for genuine controls is Kaunda's apparent determination to maintain direct authority over the Special Branch, which is charged with countersubversion, and to exempt it from rapid Africanization. The Special Branch personnel, about 350 in August 1964, were still predominantly European as of April 1965.

Kaunda's government has tightened the regulations governing the operations of foreign diplomatic missions in Lusaka. The new regulations limit diplomatic establishments to Lusaka, set a uniform quota for the staff of all missions, require advance notice for travel of diplomatic personnel outside Lusaka, and restrict social contacts between foreign diplomats and Zambian Government officials.

Kaunda's main reliance, however, is on positive manipulation rather than negative restrictions. Factional cleavages are frequent within the national liberation movements, and Kaunda has gained influence over schismatic organizations by undertaking to mediate their disputes. Last April the Zambian Government sponsored a conference among leaders of several Mozambican nationalist organizations who then formed the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO). Kaunda has also participated in several attempts to repair the breach between the principal Rhodesian nationalist organizations, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Since the ALC has generally favored mergers, Kaunda in dealing with rival leaders can use as leverage the prospect of increased support from it as well as the advantages of Zambian sponsorship.

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Kaunda usually tries to resolve these factional conflicts, not only to improve his own position with the nationalists, but because schisms tend to lead to extremist actions which complicate his problems with Zambia's white-controlled neighbors.

To curtail the infiltration of political agitators among the refugees, Lusaka leans heavily on several foreign philanthropic organizations. The International Refugee Council of Zambia, formed in April 1964, comprises local agents of the African-American Institute, Amnesty International, the Oxford Relief for Famine Fund, the Scandinavian - South African Committee, and the Joint Committee for the High Commission Territories. The Zambian minister for home affairs presides as chairman of the council, which is the primary channel for controlling the flow of refugees into the country. A large portion of the refugees from South Africa, South West Africa, and southern Mozambique gather in Bechuanaland, where the field agents of the philanthropic organizations, working with representatives of the various nationalist organizations, conduct the initial screening, forward visa applications, and arrange transportation for those who receive clearance from Lusaka.

Moreover, the foreign participants in the International Refugee Council have assumed most of the expenses and administrative burdens involved in shepherding refugees through Zambia, including maintenance of the refugee camps. The council also

has projected an agricultural training program and a secondary school at Mkushi, 100 miles north-east of Lusaka, as well as a refugee center in Lusaka, all to be financed and administered mostly by foreign agencies. The Zambian Government has proffered an annual grant of \$14,000 for the Mkushi school, and one fourth of the students may be Zambian. Since a large proportion of the refugees are young men desperately seeking careers, Kaunda regards the secondary school as especially important for his basic objective of influencing the nationalist movements toward constructive action. The relief program as a whole probably is Kaunda's most valuable asset in keeping the refugees under reasonable control.

The Refugees Find a Way

Despite the Zambian restrictions on refugee activities and Kaunda's various channels of political influence, freedom fighters, arms, and sabotage materials are continuing to flow from Zambia into the "White Redoubt" in significant quantities. For Rhodesia, this pattern has been clearly established through evidence accumulated in police investigations. Since late 1963 foreign-manufactured hand grenades and plastic explosives as well as small arms have been discovered in the possession of African nationalists, and the bulk of this material evidently has been smuggled into Rhodesia through ZAPU channels in Zambia.

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Although ZAPU and ZANU activists have shown little talent for major sabotage operations, they apparently are responsible for fairly frequent explosions and fires in white residential areas of Rhodesia or on the premises of rival African nationalists. During August 1964, the peak in the wave of random sabotage, 18 Russian grenades were exploded in Bulawayo, Rhodesia's second-largest city. Although most of the apprehended saboteurs who had received paramilitary training merely transited Zambia for training elsewhere, there are indications that ZAPU has conducted sabotage training in Zambia on a limited scale.

The white governments, especially the Rhodesians, doubt whether Kaunda has actually made an all-out effort to stop the smuggling of arms and sabotage materials through Zambia. The Rhodesian police purportedly are certain that Kaunda told ZAPU leaders shortly after Zambia became independent that he had no real objections to the movement of arms, although such traffic could not be sanctioned openly. On the other hand, it was reliably reported that ZAPU was actually compelled last fall to close down several branch offices outside Lusaka, and that a group of 20 ZAPU agents who were returning from paramilitary training elsewhere last March were denied entry into Zambia, apparently because they were armed. Last April the Zambian police raided a Lusaka residence occupied by ZAPU leaders and discovered arms

and sabotage materials. Seven ZAPU agents were indicted in open court and deported. However, it is reliably reported that the security authorities initiated this action without prior approval from Kaunda, who ordered the release without indictment of two ZAPU leaders caught in the raid.

Outlook

What Kaunda seems to have done so far is to avoid any flagrant departure from the circum-spect policy established under British tutelage. Simply holding the line may well be a significant achievement, given the pressures of the past months. The dominant party's anticolonial momentum had led foreign nationalists to expect that an independent Zambia would provide a safe haven for freedom fighters. The threat of a White Rhodesian UDI has continued to goad African nationalists to militant action, and the fighting in the Congo between black rebels and white mercenaries has intensified the pressures on Kaunda to go along with a pan-African crusade against the White Redoubt.

A sudden eruption of violence anywhere in southern Africa would build up much stronger pressures than any yet seen. The refugee nationalists fully appreciate that a dramatic international crisis offers the best prospect of breaking down Kaunda's controls, and they constantly seek to precipitate international intervention against the white regimes. From the standpoint of the

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refugee nationalists, the Rhodesian drive to entrench white supremacy offers the most immediate and the most likely opportunity for forcing Kaunda's hand.

Last fall Kaunda publicly offered to accommodate British troops, if they were sent to suppress a white rebellion in Rhodesia. Similar promises, made confidentially by Zambian cabinet ministers to Rhodesian African leaders, suggest that the latter may have drawn Kaunda into this commitment by broaching to some of his more influential supporters a broader proposition that Zambia should accommodate troops from other Commonwealth states. Last February, Rhodesian nationalists persuaded the conference of OAU foreign ministers at Nairobi to pass a resolution pledging support for an African government in exile in the event of a white UDI. In May the ALC reportedly adopted confidential

recommendations to the OAU that all members be asked to contribute arms and troops for joint intervention in the event of a UDI, that Zambia be asked to accommodate the OAU task force, and that Zambia meanwhile should be asked to accommodate irregular freedom fighters. Having offered a base for British troops, Kaunda is likely to find it difficult to refuse an OAU request for comparable collaboration.

UDI aside, the increasing number of Rhodesian Africans who have received paramilitary training may be able to increase terrorists activity in Rhodesia to a level which would provoke harsher repressive measures. These in turn might trigger international intervention, under the umbrella of the OAU or even possibly of the UN. In any of these events, Zambia seems almost certain to become more, rather than less, involved in the African nationalists' ventures. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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